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INTRODUCTION

This article takes a comparative and empirical look at two of the
most significant methods of police investigation: searches for and seizures of tangible evidence and interrogation of suspects. It first compares
American doctrine regulating these investigative tools with the analogous rules predominant in Europe. It then discusses research on the
American system that sheds light on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two regulatory regimes.
Any effort of this sort is rife with pitfalls. A comparative analysis
based on a simple comparison of rules, without consideration of the cultural, systemic, and legal contexts, can be misleading. Similarly, social
science conclusions about how certain procedures work in the American
context do not necessarily transfer to European settings. These caveats
are revisited throughout this article. They do not, however, outweigh the
potential benefits that comparative empirical analysis brings to our understanding of criminal justice and how best to regulate the police.
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The following discussion divides into two parts: the first on search
and seizure and the second on interrogation. Each part begins by recounting the relevant doctrine from the United States and from three
representative countries in Europe: England, France, and Germany. It
then explains why, in theory, one approach might be considered superior.
Finally, each part examines empirical research on the American system
that provides more insight into this issue, and ends by addressing the
implications of that research for both the American and European approaches.
More often than not, the existing data call into question preconceived notions of what "works." In particular, American reverence for
search warrants, the exclusionary rule, and "Miranda" warnings may be
based on significant misperceptions about the effect of these aspects of
American criminal procedure. This conclusion suggests some possible
hybrid approaches to police regulation that are presented in the final section of the article.

I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. UnitedStates Law
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures." It also states "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things
to be seized." Construing this language, the Supreme Court of the United
States has established that, with some exceptions described below, every
police action that constitutes a "search" for evidence of crime must be
based on probable cause, usually defined as a level of certainty close to a
more-likely-than-not standard.' Arrests must also be based on probable
cause Furthermore, "subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions," all searches must be authorized by a judicially-issued warrant that meets the probable cause and particularity
criteria.3
At the same time, the Court has announced exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements that are neither "limited" nor
always "well-delineated." The police only need reasonable suspicion-a
level of certainty well below probable cause-to conduct a stop (as opposed to an arrest) or a frisk (a patdown for weapons), and no warrant is
1. See WAYNE LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
also, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 877 (1987).
2. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

PROCEDURE

§ 3.3(b)(1984); see
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required in this situation.! Nor is a warrant needed for contemporaneous
searches of a validly arrested person or the area within the "armspan" of
that person,5 and further search of the premises in which an arrest takes
place may occur on reasonable suspicion that confederates are hiding
there.6 Police also may dispense with a warrant when conducting a
search while in hot pursuit of a suspect (unless the suspect has committed a minor crime and is in his home) and for most searches of cars that
have been stopped, although probable cause is still required in both
situations.7
Neither a warrant nor probable cause is required for a host of administrative searches such as health and safety inspections, drug testing of
employees, and post-arrest inventory searches, although each type of
search must be justified by a rational regulatory scheme.' Finally, some
types of police action, such as going through garbage, flying over backyards, and most undercover activity, are entirely unregulated under the
Fourth Amendment; these actions are not considered "searches" for
Fourth Amendment purposes because they do not involve infringement
on "reasonable expectations of privacy." 9 Similarly, a voluntary consent
to a search surrenders any expectation of privacy one normally might
have in the place searched.' °
If search and seizure rules are violated, the typical remedy in the
United States is exclusion of the evidence from the prosecution's casein-chief, with the result that the charge against the defendant must often
be dismissed." Illegally seized evidence need not be excluded, however,
if it was obtained in good faith reliance on a warrant, is used solely to
impeach a defendant who has taken the stand, or would have been discovered through legal means in any event.'2 Furthermore, a defendant
does not have "standing" to exclude illegally seized evidence if the
search did not violate his own privacy but rather intruded only upon a
third party's. 3
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
See CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS §§ 6-8 (4th ed. 2000).
8. Id. atch. 13.
9. E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding an individual has no
expectation of privacy in contents of curbside garbage); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-14 (1986) (holding flyovers of backyards are not a "search" within the meaning of Fourth
Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (holding conversations
4.
5.
6.
7.

with acquaintances do not receive Fourth Amendment protection).
10. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
I1.See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
12. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN,supra note 7, at § 2.
13. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1978).
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B. EuropeanLaw
Describing European search and seizure law is more difficult, both
because many countries are involved and because the law is often not as
well developed in some particulars (although, as noted below, it is much
more specific in certain ways). To make the task more manageable, this
discussion focuses on the laws of England, France, and Germany. Further, only an outline of that law, sufficient to enable comparisons with
United States doctrine, is provided. Thus, from among the many differences between the European and American search and seizure regimes,
this article focuses on two in particular: the use of warrants and the exclusionary remedy.
Those differences can be summarized briefly before giving more detail below. In all three European countries, warrants are not as important
as they are in the United States, either because they are not required as
often, or because they are issued on a showing of less than probable
cause, or both. Similarly, European countries do not rely as heavily on
exclusion as a means of sanctioning illegal searches and seizures, but
instead resort to other remedial devices or do not sanction police misconduct at all.
In England, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
(PACE), warrants must be based on the equivalent of probable cause and
may only be issued if the police can show that they seek either evidence
of an offense involving more than five years imprisonment, or drugs or
stolen property. 4 Warrants are required in the same circumstances in
which they are required in the United States, with one significant exception. In the United States, as noted above, a search incident to a home
arrest is limited to the arrestee's person, the area within the arrestee's
armspan and, if police suspect a confederate is on the premises, areas in
which that confederate might be hiding. Additionally, these searches
must be contemporaneous with the arrest. In England, in contrast, police
may conduct a full search of the arrestee's house without judicial authorization (although in some cases they must obtain a supervising
inspector's authorization), so long as the search is for evidence related to
the offense. 5 Furthermore, this warrantless search of the premises need
not take place at the time of the arrest, but may be conducted some time
later (perhaps up to a few hours later), and may even occur when the ar-

14. Craig Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal Procedure
Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171, 180-81 (1993).
15. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 §§ 18(4-5), 32(2)(b) (Eng.) [hereinafter PACE].
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rest takes place outside the home. 6 According to one study, only about
12% of premise searches conducted in England are based on a warrant
and about 55% of the warrantless house searches are searches incident to
arrest. 7
In France most rules governing searches and seizures are found in
the Code de Proc6dure P6nale (CPP). French police investigating a "recent" major felony (a "flagrant" offense) are never required to obtain a
judicial order of the type envisioned under American law. Either they
seek no authorization at all or an investigating judge delegates search
authority to them through a "rogatory commission," which "need not
meet any degree of suspicion or specify the parties or places to be
searched or things to be seized." 8 For non-flagrant offenses, either consent or permission from a judge or his delegate is needed to conduct a
search, but "no actual warrant or other detailed order needs to be is sued"; furthermore, the "delegate" can be a prosecutor or upper level
police officer who then supervises the investigation. '9 French law does,
however, limit search authority to specialized "judicial police," and requires that either the person whose premises are searched or other
civilians be present during the search. 0
Under the German Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), the premises
of an arrestee may be searched without a warrant.2' Nor are warrants required in most other circumstances. The German Code permits forgoing
a warrant not only in cases of "hot pursuit," but also when there is "danger in delay."22 Although a three-decade old description of German law
asserts that this latter concept is very narrowly defined,23 a more recent
review concluded that "the great majority of searches are conducted
without any prior judicial authorization [because] police usually assume

16. See MICHAEL

ZANDER, THE POLICE & CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT OF

1984 51, 79 (2d

ed. 1990).
17.

VAUGHN BEVAN & KEN LIDSTONE,

A

GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVI-

1984 45-46 (1985).
18. See Richard S. Frase, France: Rules of Criminal Procedure, in CRAIG BRADLEY,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 153 (1999); see also CODE DE PROCEDURE
PINAL, 1987, arts. 151-55 (English translation by Gerald Kock & Richard Frase, 1988) [hereinafter CPP].
19. Frase, supra note 18, at 154. See also, CPP, supra 18, at art. 76; CRAIG BRADLEY,
DENCE ACT OF

THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 119(1993).

20. CPP, supra note 18, arts. 16-21, 95-97.

21. See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 102 (English translation by Horst Neibler,
1973) [hereinafter CCP]; see also Thomas Weigend, Germany Rules of Criminal Procedure,in
CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, 194 n.27.
22. CCP, supra note 21, at § 104.
23. See GERHARD O.W. MUELLER & FR9 LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

16-17 (1969).
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that there is 'danger in delay.' ,,2 Accordingly, perhaps only 10% of
house searches are conducted pursuant to a warrant. 25 If there is any supervision of the search process, it is normally carried out by the
prosecutor.26 Furthermore, a "rather vague suspicion is a sufficient basis
for search.",2' Like the French system, however, the target of the investigation or an adult relative is entitled to be present during the search.
Differences in European and American sanctioning practices are
even greater. In all three European countries, exclusion has become more
common in recent years. But it is still extremely rare. 9 In England, exclusion is required only when, in the judge's discretion, admission of the
evidence would make the proceedings unfair," a provision which is generally interpreted to require exclusion only of unreliable evidence or
evidence obtained through egregious police action.' While this rule does
lead to exclusion of illegally obtained confessions with some regularity,
evidence from illegal searches is routinely admitted.12 Likewise, in
France, there are a number of situations in which an illegality may lead
to a "nullity," but virtually none of them involve searches and seizures.33
Germany's approach to exclusion is the most interesting. German
courts balance the degree of intrusion and bad faith on the part of the
police against the seriousness of the offense and the importance of the
evidence. If the intrusion is great enough (e.g., seizure of a diary), exclusion may occur even if no illegality occurred. On the other hand, in

24. Weigend, supra note 21 and accompanying text. In a recent decision, however, the
German Supreme Court construed "danger in delay" more restrictively, and required 24-hour
availability of judges, documentation of the reasons the police or prosecutor assumed there
was danger in delay, and judicial review of the investigative decision. Federal Constitutional
Court, decision of February 20, 2001 (BverfGE, Urt. V., 2 BvR 1444/00). It remains to be seen
whether this decision will change police practice, because exclusion is still only required if
police consciously violate the law. Id.
25. Weigend, supra note 21, at 194-95 n.32.
26. See Volker F Krey, Characteristic Features of German Criminal Proceedings-An Alternative to the Criminal Procedure Law of the United States?, Address at Loyola University at
Los Angeles (March 9, 1999), in 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 591, 597-98 (1999).
27. Weigend, supra note 21, at 193-94.
28. CCP, supra note 21, at § 106.
29. See generally, Bradley, supra note 14.
30. PACE, supra note 15, at § 78.
31. See David Feldman, England: Rules of Criminal Procedure, in CRAIG BRADLEY,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 105.
32. See Zander, supra note 16, at 210.
33. See Frase, supra note 18, at 155-56 ("Most violations give rise to exclusion only if
they are deemed to have violated 'substantial' provisions of the Code or other laws related to
criminal procedure."). But see Walter Pakter, Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany, and
Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. R. 1,37 n.266 (1985).
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of
serious cases, exclusion of contraband or fruits and instrumentalities
34
crime is very unlikely, especially if the evidence is crucial.
It has been alleged that European countries depend upon other
means, such as internal police discipline, to ensure police adherence to
investigative rules.35 To date, however, virtually no information exists
concerning how often, or even whether, police are disciplined for violations of search and seizures rules, as opposed to other types of
transgressions.36
C. An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Differences
Under American theory, both warrants and exclusion are important,
if not crucial, means of preventing police abuse of the search and seizure
power. Justice Jackson best described the preference for warrants when
he explained that the Fourth Amendment's protection "consists in requiring that ...inferences [about criminal activity] be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."37 Similarly,
although the Supreme Court has advanced a number of rationales to support the exclusionary rule over the years,38 today the Court emphasizes
that the rule's sole raison d'etre is its efficacy at deterring police misconduct.3 9

Thus, an American lawyer might criticize European search and seizure law for its relatively nonchalant attitude toward warrants and
exclusion. This criticism assumes, however, that warrants and the exclusionary rule are crucial mechanisms for controlling the police.
Furthermore, it ignores the possibility that, even if warrants and exclusion are effective in this regard, their regulatory benefit is outweighed by
their negative impact on crime control. A fair amount of research exploring these assumptions exists.

34. See Bradley, supra note 14, at 208-12. See also Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, 2d Senat, of Sept. 14, 1989 (BverfGE 80, 367) (holding diary of appellant,
charged with killing a young woman, was admissible in large part because of the seriousness
of crime and relevance of its contents to appellant's motivations).
35. John Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and
Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1556-61 (1978).
36. Weigend, supra note 21, at 204 (asserting German disciplinary measures occur only
in cases of police brutality); see infra note 91 (concerning France's administrative remedies).
37. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
38. Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 ILL.
L. REV. 363, 423-442 (describing Fifth Amendment, property, status quo ante, judicial review
and due process theories supporting the rule).
39. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1973) (holding deterrence of police is
the only basis for exclusion); see also, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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Warrants. The most authoritative information about the warrant
process in the United States comes from a seven-jurisdiction study
conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC). This study
found that the "vast majority" of searches are conducted without a
warrant,40 a conclusion that directly undercuts Justice Jackson's
suggestion that warrants play a significant role in regulating police
behavior. Warrants do, however, figure prominently in searches of
premises, universally considered the most private space.4' Furthermore,
the percentage of premise-searches conducted pursuant to a warrant in
the United States, while unknown, is likely to be much higher than the
twelve and ten percent figures in England and Germany reported above
(given the law of search incident in those countries), and is undoubtedly
higher than the analogous figure in France.
Whether warrants provide any real privacy protection is more difficult to tell. The NCSC study revealed that when police did seek a
warrant, magistrates spent less than three minutes reviewing their application in 65% of the cases, devoted more than five minutes to the
application in only 11% of the cases, and rejected only 8% of the applications.4 ' A separate study found that judges are even less likely to reject
law enforcement requests for electronic surveillance warrants; of the
20,107 applications submitted for such warrants at the federal level between 1968 and 1995, only 27 were denied, and none were denied
between 1988 and 1995. ' These findings suggest that magistrates usually "rubberstamp" police applications, and that the neutral, independent
judgment of the type lauded by Justice Jackson rarely takes place. That
conclusion is reinforced by the NCSC's finding that police often sought
out particular magistrates believed to be friendly to police views on investigation.
Another possible reason warrant applications are so rarely rejected,
however, is that most of them are meritorious. The NCSC study found
that officers routinely request that their supervisors or the prosecutor
check their application before submitting it to the magistrate, that magistrates more than occasionally ask the police to provide additional
information before issuing the warrant, and that only 5% of the warrants
that are issued are subsequently found invalid . Conceivably, a three
40.

RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., L. PAUL SUTTON & CHARLOTTE

A. CARTER,
21 (1985).

THE

SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES

41. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 32-33.
43. CHRISTOPHER

SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTI-

GATION: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS

192 (2d ed. 1998).

44. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 40, at 47-49.
45. Id. at 24-25, 31, 8-11.
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minute review is all that is necessary in many cases, because police
knowledge that a judicial officer will check their investigative efforts and
reasoning, even if only in a cursory fashion, encourages genuine requests.
At least two theoretical reasons, both advanced by Professor Stuntz,
support the belief that the warrant process discourages illegal searches.46
First, the process may reduce judicial bias favoring the police, and therefore police reliance on such bias, because a magistrate grants or denies a
warrant application before he knows whether the police will find the evidence. In contrast, judicial review of a warrantless search occurs after
the search, typically during a hearing to suppress evidence. Because the
magistrate in this hearing inevitably knows the police have found incriminating evidence, "hindsight reasoning," a phenomenon known to
infect other assessments of police behavior,47 may taint his probable
cause determination. Second, the warrant process may reduce illegality
by making police fabrication difficult, again because the probable cause
determination occurs before the search takes place. In contrast, fabrication is relatively simple during ex post review of a warrantless search,
when the officer can more easily concoct "justifications" for his actions
based on known prior events.
Ultimately, however, whether illegal searches would increase if the
warrant requirement were abolished or relaxed remains unknown. Although the NCSC study found that only approximately 12% of those
warrant-based searches that were challenged were found invalid,48 that
failure rate is only slightly lower than the suppression rate of 14.6% for
all searches. 49 Furthermore, even if police are found to violate the Fourth
Amendment at a higher rate when they conduct warrantless searches,
that differential could be due to a number of third variables, including a
reviewing court's reluctance to second-guess a fellow judicial officer's
warrant decision.
A warrant requirement may even detract from effective law enforcement. According to the NCSC study, drafting and submitting a
warrant application may take as long as half a day (although the advent
of telephonic warrants in some jurisdictions has significantly reduced
46. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,

910-18 (1991).
47. Christopher Slobogin & Joe Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permittedby Society," 42 DUKE L. J. 727, 765-768 (1993) (finding an inverse relationship

between knowledge that evidence was discovered in a search and the level of intrusiveness
associated with the search) [hereinafter Slobogin & Schumacher].
48. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 40, at 42.
49. Peter Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the ExclusionaryRule: An EmpiricalAssessment,
1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 585, 597 tbl.7 (1983).
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that period)." If the only searches discouraged by this process are those
for which the police lack probable cause, then the warrant requirement is
functioning properly. But the requirement creates perverse incentives if
the hassle of obtaining a warrant is discouraging police from conducting
searches in cases where probable cause exists. The cumbersome nature
of the process may even encourage illegal searches if police try to evade
it through dubious consent searches or arrests staged in areas where warrants are not required (e.g., the car). As one officer quoted in the NCSC
study stated, 98% of his searches were conducted after securing the target's "consent," sometimes obtained through (often unfounded) threats to
secure a warrant unless the target granted entry.'
Exclusionary rule. Several types of research address whether exclusion of illegally obtained evidence deters police violations of the Fourth
Amendment. One strain of empirical evidence consists of pre/post studies examining the effect of Mapp v. Ohio5 2 -the Supreme Court decision
making the exclusionary rule applicable to the states-on various aspects
of police conduct such as warrant applications and arrest statistics. Another group of studies involves surveys of and interviews with police and
other actors in the legal system about their search conduct and their attitudes toward the exclusionary rule. A third type of research tests police
knowledge of Fourth Amendment rules, on the theory that a sanction
meant to deter should create an incentive to know the relevant law.
Unfortunately, the pre/post studies were seriously flawed. PostMapp changes in the number of search warrants issued, arrest and conviction rates, or the amount of recovered stolen property and seized
contraband-in theory, possible indications of the rule's effect-turned
out to be influenced by a number of other variables as well. These include changes in crime rates, police priorities, and Fourth Amendment
rules.53 Poor record-keeping prior to Mapp also afflicted the studies. 4
These difficulties critically undermined pre/post research on the exclusionary rule. For instance, Professor Canon, although a supporter of the
rule, felt compelled to conclude that his findings "do not come close to
supporting a claim that the rule wholly or largely works."55 Similarly,
Dallin Oaks, a researcher who argued against retaining the exclusionary
rule, admitted that his results "obviously fall short of an empirical sub50. VAN DuIZEND, supra note 40, at 85-87, 149.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. Thomas Y Davies, Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluationsof the Exclusionary Rule: A Critiqueof the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra,69 Nw. L.
REV. 740, 756-64 (1974).
54. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1976).
55. Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policiesat the State and
FederalLevels: The Case of the ExclusionaryRule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57, 75 (1977).
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stantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of the rule.' 5 6 Such honesty by opponents in the debate over the exclusionary rule is
commendable, but its import is distressing for those trying to devise policy. As Professor Davies concluded, "When all factors are considered,
there is virtually no likelihood that the Court is going to receive any
'relevant statistics' which objectively measure the 'practical efficacy' of
the exclusionary rule."57
Interviews of police and other actors in the system also produced
ambiguous findings about the consequences of the rule. Surveys conducted shortly after Mapp indicated agreement among attorneys and
judges that exclusion had a greater impact on police behavior than the
civil or criminal sanctions that had comprised the main method of sanctioning illegal searches and seizures before that case was decided." That
result, however, merely confirmed what the Court itself recognized in
Mapp-that existing alternatives to the rule were "futile" as deterrents.
It did not show that the rule was effective at discouraging police misconduct, but only that it was superior to the toothless remedies that predated
Mapp.
Interviews with police similarly suggest that the rule, while better
than other devices at influencing their search behavior, may not be significantly better. For instance, such research often reports that police say
they resent the rule or that they learned valuable lessons when evidence
they seized was suppressed, findings which are said to indicate that the
rule affects their actions.' Yet a survey of more than 200 police from two
southeastern cities found that 19% admitted to conducting searches of
"questionable constitutionality" at least once a month, and 4% said that
they conducted searches they knew to be unconstitutional at least once a
month, meaning that several hundred constitutionally suspect searches
occur each year in just these two departments (out of over 15,000 nationwide). 6' Even more discouraging to proponents of the rule are the
results of a survey of several hundred California police asking which
56. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 665, 709 (1970).
57. Davies, supra note 53, at 763-64.
58. See Michael Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio
in North Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1966);
Stuart S. Nagel, Law and Society: Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 283, 302 (1965).
59. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (noting other remedies had proven "worthless and futile").
60. See Myron W. Orfield, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1066-67 (1987).
61. Ronald L. Akers & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Exclusionary Rule: Legal Doctrine and
Social Research on Constitutional Norms, 2 SAM HOUSTON ST. U. CRIM. JUST. CENT. RES.
BULL. 1-6 (1986).
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remedy for illegal searches they preferred. Most officers picked the exclusionary rule, not only over damages (which would take money
directly out of their pockets), but also over more training.62 Apparently,
the police would rather put up with the risk of exclusion than sit through
a few more hours in the classroom.
One fairly robust finding of the pre/post research and survey studies
is that Mapp at least brought about a significant increase in such training
programs, presumably because prosecutors and police departments, worried about losing cases, wanted their officers to learn Fourth Amendment
law. 63 The final category of research, examining the effectiveness of these
programs, also produced frustrating results. One study involving over
450 officers found that officers as a group performed better than chance
on only one out of six questions about search and seizure law.'" A second
study testing police knowledge found that the "average officer did not
know or understand proper search and seizure rules" and that "supervisors or senior officers only achieved slightly improved scores., 65 A third
study involving 296 officers demonstrated a "widespread inability to apply the law of search and seizure or police interrogation." 6 Lending
credence to theses findings are the observations of Professor Stephen
Wasby, who studied numerous police training programs in the 1970s (before many of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule existed). Wasby
concluded that "[r]ecruit training is sadly lacking in criminal procedure
content" and that "[t]he spirit and tone of communication about the law,
particularly when the law is favorable to defendants' rights, is6 7often
negative, with the need for compliance stressed only infrequently."
Why does the exclusionary rule-which, after all, can result in the
dismissal of serious criminal charges-have so little effect on individual
officers or on training programs? Behavioral theory suggests one answer
to this question. That theory posits that punishment, to be effective, must
be frequent, consistent, immediate and intense." The exclusionary rule,
as applied in the United States, violates all of these precepts. First, ex62. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83
IOWA L. REV. 669, 733 tbl.7 (1999).
63. See Yale Kamisar, Remembering the Old World of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 557-59 (1990).
64. William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH J.L. REFORM
311, 333 (1991).
65. Eugene Michael Hynan, In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police
Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC. L.J. 33, 47 (1979).
66. Perrin, supra note 62, at 727.
67. Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training about Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inadequate, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 461, 464-66 (1978).
68. JON L. WILLIAMS, OPERANT LEARNING: PROCEDURES FOR CHANGING BEHAVIOR

154-55 (1973).
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clusion only occurs when there is a prosecution, which is an infrequent
event; the vast majority of police-citizen encounters never progress beyond the street level.69 Second, even when charges are brought, pleabargaining often short-circuits them, perhaps as often as 90% of the
time,"° which frequently means that the validity of a search goes unchallenged. Further, as discussed earlier, when suppression hearings do take
place, police fabrication and judicial hindsight bias often result in a finding for the prosecution in close cases. The many exceptions to the
exclusionary rule-good faith reliance on a warrant, impeachment, inevitable discovery and lack of standing-also diminish the chance of
exclusion. On those few occasions when suppression does occur, it may
take place well after the illegal conduct and never be communicated to
the officer."
Finally, and probably most importantly, the exclusionary punishment
is not directed at the officer or the department but at the prosecutor. Sociological research clearly establishes that a policeman is most interested
in the "collar," with conviction a distant and often irrelevant consideration. 2 That means that exclusion is a very indirect sanction on the
average officer. For these and related reasons, the rule is not an effective
behavior-shaping mechanism.73
Legitimacy-compliance theory, developed by Tom Tyler,14 may
provide another explanation for the relatively weak impact of the
exclusionary rule. Legitimacy-compliance theory suggests that obedience
to the law stems as much from respect for the law and those who
promulgate it as from a fear of punishment for unlawful behavior. Because
the rule "sanctions" the police by helping a guilty individual, and because
it "punishes" virtually all police violations of the Fourth Amendment, even
those that are inadvertent, officers may not perceive suppression of
evidence as legitimate, even if they support the values underlying the
Amendment. The previously reported resentment that police feel toward
the rule, far from showing a willingness to comply with search and seizure
69. Neil A. Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW &
467,476-78 (1971); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A
SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 437 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1965).
CONTEMP. PROBS.

70. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY xi-xii (1998) (stating plea bargain rate is approximately 93% in
the federal system and approximately 91% among states).
71. Francis A. Gilligan, The FederalTorts Claims Act-An Alternative to the Exclusionary
Rule?, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1975) ("Neither the judge nor the prosecutor
adequately explains a court ruling on the exclusionary rule so that it might be understood by
the police officer.").
72. See JONATHAN RUBENSTEIN, CITY POLICE 45 (1973).
73. See Slobogin, supra note 38, at 373-81, for an elaboration on these arguments.
74. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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doctrine, might instead indicate disrespect for this method of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment, and thus foster passive-aggressive resistance toward
it. Such resistance might manifest itself through any number of
mechanisms, including lying about probable cause or exigency, covering
for other officers' transgressions, and simply avoiding prosecution when
illegality cannot be hidden.75
None of this is meant to suggest that research and theory prove the
exclusionary rule is inferior to other available means of controlling police misconduct. In the United States, civil, criminal, and administrative
remedies for illegal searches and seizures are almost as impotent today
as they were prior to Mapp.76 Even when lawsuits or disciplinary actions
against the police arise, proof of "good faith" generally prevents any
remedy." On those few occasions when a plaintiff convinces a jury to
levy damages against a police officer, the department usually provides
indemnification, significantly undermining the verdict's deterrent effect."8 Thus, the exclusionary rule, despite its flaws, remains the most
potent domestic remedy.
Perhaps for that reason, it is also the most "expensive." Estimates of
convictions lost because of the rule range from 0.6% to 7.1%, depending
upon the jurisdiction and type of crime.79 Approximately 10,000 felons
and 55,000 misdemeanants evade punishment each year because of successful Fourth Amendment suppression motions. ° Other, more subtle,
"costs" of the rule include the exacerbation of adversarial tensions between police, suspects, and attorneys because of the high stakes
associated with illegal searches, 8' the distracting impact of suppression
hearings on the quality of defense representation, 2 and the damage to
courts and government generally resulting from public outrage at the

75. See Slobogin, supra note 38, at 375-81, for an elaboration on these points.
76. Id. at 370-72.

77. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (establishing good-faith exception
under § 1983); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (establishing good faith exception
under federal tort law).
78. See Daniel Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as PrivateAttorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 283-

85(1988).
79. Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984).
80. Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn) about
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611,669-70 (1983).
8 1. WILLIAM T. Pizzi, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS
HAS BEEN AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED To Do To REBUILD IT 40-42, 22223 (1999).
82. William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationshipbetween Criminal Procedureand Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 31-45 (1997).
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benefit criminals receive when their charges are dismissed or reduced by
exclusion. 3
Existing alternatives to the rule are less costly on all these measures.
In particular, they clearly sacrifice fewer convictions. It must be noted,
however, that this difference results primarily from their inadequacy. An
effective alternative to the rule, one which ensured that police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, would also result in at least some "lost"
convictions, because it would scare police away from a certain number
of searches and seizures that would have generated evidence of crime. 4
D. Implications of the Research
Despite some good empirical efforts, we do not know how much extra protection a warrant provides, nor is there convincing evidence that
exclusion deters police misconduct on a routine basis. The research does
firmly suggest, however, that warrants raise police officers' "standard of
care" when they decide whether to conduct a search, 5 and that the exclusionary rule is superior to existing means of deterring police conduct. Do
these conclusions mean that the United States, which is relatively more
invested in warrants and exclusion, does a "better" job at regulating
searches and seizures than England, France or Germany? Perhaps so, but
a definitive answer to such comparative inquiries must take into account
cultural, systemic and legal differences.
First, various aspects of European culture may call for a different
cost-benefit analysis than policymakers and citizens in the United States
might make. European societies tend to be more homogenous than the
United States, which may reduce concerns about discriminatory treatment by law enforcement.86 Similarly, Europe's long tradition of
centralized and often authoritarian regimes, as well as its relatively compact living conditions, may make its citizens more tolerant of strong
police power and less concerned about privacy and autonomy. Finally,
83. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26

STAN.

L.

REV. 1027, 1035-36

(1974).
84. Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MicH. L. REV. 1, 47 n.211 (1987); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
FourthAmendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994).
85. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 40, at 148-49.
86. For instance, there is as yet no practice in Europe akin to stopping people for "driving

while black," a widely documented phenomenon in the United States. Cf. David A. Harris, The
Stories, the Statistics and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV.

265 (1999).
87. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 47, at 769. Providing indirect support for these
speculations is a study which revealed significant differences between American and Australian subjects in their evaluations of the intrusiveness of various police search techniques, with
the Americans routinely gauging those techniques to be more intrusive than their Australian
counterparts. Id.
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Europeans may trust authorities to a greater extent than Americans,
meaning that they are more willing to believe, perhaps with good reason,
that their police won't behave improperly." Thus, any relatively greater
leniency toward law enforcement that does exist in Europe may reflect
entrenched cultural differences rather than a lesser regard for "fundamental" values.
Second, even if basic values concerning the relationship between the
state and the individual were identical in the two societies, systemic differences between the United States and Europe might create a greater
need for police regulation in the United States. Because of variations in
education and training, 9 police in Europe may be more professional than
American police and concomitantly less in need of monitoring. Higher
crime rates and the prevalence of guns and drugs in the United States
may place more pressure on American police to bend the rules, thus requiring harsher penalties for violation. The adversarial nature of the
American criminal justice system itself may make police in the United
States more aggressive, and therefore more in need of regulation than
European police, who are immersed, at least in theory, in a tradition of
relatively neutral inquiry.'
Third, comparisons of individual legal rules, such as the warrant
preference and exclusion, can mislead because they ignore how other
legal rules compensate for or interact with the rules in question. For instance, the requirements that searches be conducted by certain types of
police or under the supervision of the prosecutor, that they be limited to
serious crimes, that they be monitored by third parties, and that they be
sanctioned administratively if illegal-all components of one or more
European systems--do not exist in the United States, at least not on a
national level. Some commentators question the extent to which these
aspects of the European system provide any meaningful limitation on the
police;9' for example, as in the United States, internal and monetary

88. See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 584 (1972).
89. Compare Thomas Feltes, Police Research in Germany, in COMMUNITY POLICING:
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICY WORK (1993) (noting German

police normally attend at least three years of academy) with U.S. Dep't of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook 302 (1996) (recognizing American police may attend no more than
three months of training).
90. Damaska, supra note 88, at 584 ("The ideology supporting modem non-adversary
procedure ... exhibits much less distrust of police, prosecutors, judges, and public officials in
general.").
91. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out and Why Should We Care? 78 CAL. L.

REV. 539, 586 (1999) ("The French themselves are skeptical of [administrative] remedies.").
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sanctions are rare in Europe,92 and third party monitoring only influences
the execution of a search, not the decision to carry it out (and may even
increase illicit intrusion into privacy).93 The point remains that comparisons of selected components of a system must be evaluated in context.
II. INTERROGATION
A. United States Law
Until the mid-1960s, judicial regulation of the interrogation process
in the United States focused entirely on whether a suspect's statements
were "involuntary" and thus inadmissible. As developed under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, voluntariness analysis requires
evaluating the "totality of the circumstances" in which the confession
occurred, in particular the interaction between police conduct and the
vulnerabilities of the suspect.9" Thus, for instance, the United States Supreme Court has declared "involuntary" a confession obtained after 9a5suspect was questioned continuously for 36 hours without rest or sleep,
as well as a confession obtained from a suspect who was informed that
welfare for her children would be cut off and her children taken away
from her if she failed to "cooperate. 96 While originally the Court seemed
concerned that such techniques would produce unreliable confessions,
by 1961 it excluded such confessions:
not because [they] are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the
enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and
not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and

92. One might also question whether an exclusionary remedy will work in a system, such
as exists in France and Germany, that exposes the decisionmaker to all the evidence
accumulated during the investigation, regardless of how it was obtained, a fact police surely
know. MIRJAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 49-50 (1997) (suggesting that, given the
fact that Continental judges, who operate without juries, hear about illegally seized evidence,

"identity in the wording of Continental and Anglo-American exclusionary rules can ... be
deceptive"). As Professor Damaska also points out, however, continental decision makers have
to justify their decision in writing without reference to illegally obtained evidence, so exclusion may still make convictions difficult despite the decision maker's knowledge of such
evidence. Id.
93. See id. at 50-51.
94. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) ("The limits in any case depend upon a
weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing'").
95. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944).
96. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
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may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of
his own mouth.97
Although the Court has never veered from this basic principle, it has
since resorted to two other methods of regulating interrogation besides
the due process clause. First, in 1964, the Court held that, under the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, suspects who have been formally charged are entitled to
counsel during interrogation.98 More importantly, two years later in
Miranda v. Arizona99 the Court held that, under the Fifth Amendment's
"privilege against self-incrimination," any suspects subjected to custodial
interrogation, even those not formally charged, have a right to remain
silent and a right to counsel. The suspect also is entitled to four "warnings" before interrogation begins: that the suspect has a right to remain
silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that the suspect
has a right to counsel during interrogation; and that an attorney will be
appointed if the suspect cannot afford one. If these warnings are not
given, any statements obtained as a result must be excluded from evidence. '°° Even if the warnings are given, statements that are
"involuntary" in the due process sense are excluded. Furthermore, a defendant who does talk has the right to end questioning at any time, and
his refusal to answer questions may not be used against him in court. 0°
These holdings were all designed to implement the Fifth Amendment's
provision stating that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled" to testify
against himself.
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has limited its holding significantly. First, police need not give the warnings when doing so would
pose a threat to public safety because, for example, a suspect's silence
might prevent police from discovering a dangerous weapon. °2 Second,
although questioning must cease when the suspect asserts the right to
counsel, if the defendant who has invoked that right reinitiates conversation-a concept the Court has defined broadly'°--the police may
continue questioning him.' °" Moreover, if the suspect merely asserts his
right to remain silent (as opposed to his right to counsel), police proba97. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
98. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

100. Id. at 474-75.
10 1. Id. at 476.
102. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 650 (1984) (adopting a "public safety" exception to Miranda).
103. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (holding defendant's

statement "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" to be initiation under this standard).
104. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
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bly need not wait for the defendant to reinitiate conversation, so long as
there 05is a reasonable interval between interrogations and they rewarn
him.
Third, the Court has sanctioned several forms of trickery after the
warnings are given. For instance, on two occasions the Court held valid a
confession given by a suspect who apparently thought that so long as his
statements were not reduced to writing they could not be used against
him, a misimpression the police failed to correct."' 6 In another case, the
Court upheld the confession of a suspect who was misinformed about
the subject matter of the investigation. 07 The Court has also refused to
exclude confessions obtained after police lied about finding fingerprints
at the scene of the crime,' after they falsely told the suspect that his colleague had already confessed to the crime,"°9 and after they deceived the
defendant's attorney about when interrogation would take place."0 Finally, a confession obtained by an undercover agent, even one posing as
a cellmate, does not violate Miranda."' In each case, the Supreme Court
reasoned that the police action was insufficiently coercive to violate the
Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled testimony.
Finally, as with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Court
has narrowed the scope of exclusion after a Mirandaviolation. Although
a statement obtained by an unwarned suspect must be excluded from the
prosecution's case-in-chief, the Court has not required exclusion of
evidence obtained as a result of such a statement (e.g., a witness
identified in the statement, or another confession given under the' 2
impression that the unwarned statement "let the cat out of the bag")."
Furthermore, even a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is
admissible for impeachment purposes.' 3 Confessions that are

105. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975) (upholding admission of
statement obtained after defendant asserted right to silence, police returned two hours later
and rewarned defendant, and then questioned defendant about another crime).
106. E.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 371-72 (1979) (upholding confession
of defendant who agreed to talk but refused to sign a waiver of his rights, stating "Iwill talk to
you but I am not signing any form"); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527 (1987) (upholding confession of defendant who refused to give a written statement in the absence of an
attorney but was willing to make oral statements).
107. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987).
108. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495-96 (1977).
109. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969).
110. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 415-20 (1986) (finding no Miranda violation despite false police statements assuring defendant's attorney that his client would not be
interrogated). However, the Court avoided deciding whether such misleading assertions violated due process. Id.
11l.Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990).
112. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985).
113. See Harris v. NewYork, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).

HeinOnline -- 22 Mich. J. Int'l L. 441 2000-2001

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 22:423

involuntary in the .due process
sense as well as their fruits, however,
4
continue to be excluded.1
B. European Law
As with search and seizure doctrine, European interrogation rules
differ significantly from their American counterparts. The following
discussion will note most of these differences, but will concentrate on
the warnings requirement, the use of trickery and taping during
interrogation, and the remedy for violation of the rules. Like the
discussion of search and seizure law, the description is necessarily brief,
sufficient only to provide grounds for comparison with American law.
Of the three European countries, English interrogation law is the
most elaborate. A defendant must receive a "caution" about the right to
remain silent as soon as there are "grounds to suspect" him of criminal
activity."' In contrast, only "custody" triggers Miranda, meaning that
English police may be required to give warnings at an earlier point than
American police. Beginning in 1994 with passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, however, English police must also inform the
suspect that adverse inferences can be drawn from his silence."' 6 Furthermore, although the suspect is entitled to counsel before and during
interrogation, police need not tell him of that right until he is brought to
the police station," 7 and this caution may be delayed if a superintendent
or higher level officer decides that exercise of the right would lead to
interference with evidence, harm to others, or escape of a suspect. "' If
the suspect does exercise the right to counsel, questioning must stop until an attorney has been consulted, except in urgent circumstances of the
type just described." 9 Counsel may be present during the interrogation
unless he begins answering questions for his client or in some other
egregious way "prevents the proper putting of questions to his client."'2
Perhaps in part because of this latter provision, counsel in England often

114. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at § 16.05.
115. Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police
Officers, 1991, § 10.1 (Eng.). Even questioning by an undercover agent, if it is particularly
pointed, may require cautions. See R. v. Bryce, 4 All E.R. 567, 571-73 (1992).

116. See Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by
Police Officers, 1991, § 10.4 (Eng.); see also Zander, supra note 15, at 303-11. Police may

also continue questioning after assertion of the right to silence.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON

56-57 (1993).
117. Zander, supra note 16, at 106. See PACE, supra note 16, at § 58.
118. See PACE, supra note 15, at § 58.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: REPORT

119. See Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by
Police Officers, 1991, § 6.6 (Eng.).
120. Id. at §§ 6.9-6.11.
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play 2a passive role during interrogation, and seldom terminate questioning. 1
In addition to the cautions requirements, a number of other interrogation rules exist. All interviews in the police station must be tape-22
recorded, although interviews that take place elsewhere need not be.'
After the defendant is formally charged, all questioning must cease
unless the police seek information about other offenses.'23 Various rules
govern how often the suspect receives breaks, food, and so on.'2 Finally,
although trickery is not unknown in English interrogations,' 25 English
courts have declared that misrepresentation of available evidence and
other types of deceit are 27not permissible.'26 Research suggests that use of
such techniques is rare.1
Breach of these rules does not necessarily lead to exclusion of the
confession, however. If the violation was inadvertent, a solicitor was present at the time, or the violation did not affect the suspect's decision to
confess, exclusion is unlikely. 2 ' On the other hand, complete failure to
caution a suspect and wrongful refusal of access to legal advice are substantial breaches that lead to exclusion. Intentional failure to29 abide by the
recording requirements usually leads to exclusion as well.
Prior to June, 2000, French suspects were accorded very little
protection during interrogation. Although they had a right to remain
silent, they were not told of that right, and were not entitled to consult
counsel during the first 20 hours of detention. 30 Today they are informed
of the right to silence and to consult counsel during detention.' Further,
records are kept of these various warnings, as well as of the length of
interrogation.' However, suspects are still not entitled to have counsel
present during interrogation. ' After charging, any interrogation that
121.

See John Baldwin, Legal Advice in the Police Station, 142 NEW L.J. 1762, 1763

(1992).
122. See PACE, supra note 15, § 60.
123. See Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by
Police Officers, 1991, § 11.4 (Eng.).
124. Id. at §§ 8.6, 12.2.
125. See Mark Berger, Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: A Statutory Approach to Police Interrogations,24 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 1, 23-24 (1990).
126. Feldman, supra note 31, at 111-12.
127. See John Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?, 33
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 325, 331 n.27 (1993); see also, R. v. Kirk, 1 W.L.R. 567 (C.A. 2000)
(excluding confession obtained after police misled suspect about seriousness of charge).
128. Feldman, supra note 31, at 113-14.
129. See id.; see also Bradley, supra note 14, at 188-89.
130. Frase, supra note 18, at 158-59.

131. CPP, supra note 18, at § 63-1. French law was amended in June, 2000 to require
these warnings. Id.
132. Frase, supra note 18, at 159.
133. Id.
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takes place will usually be conducted by a judge (who is permitted to tell
the suspect that silence will be used against him), but further police
interrogation is not barred. The defendant has a right to counsel during
these post-charge sessions with the police, unless he waives it or the
lawyer fails to appear.3 4 Exclusion for violations of these rules is rare,
but has occurred when counsel was not provided after the 20-hour
period, 3the
48-hour rule was violated, or detention rights were not
5
recited.
In Germany, as in England, suspects must be informed of the right to
remain silent and the subject matter of the investigation whenever they
are the focus of an investigation.'36 Police must also inform suspects of
their right to consult a defense attorney prior to interrogation.' 37 However, suspects have no right to counsel during interrogation and the state
need not provide one for them if they are indigent. Furthermore, German
courts routinely admit evidence obtained during "informal" interviews
that take place before the administration of warnings, apparently on the
ground that the interviewees are not treated like suspects during these
conversations.' 38 If the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent, police
may continue to question the suspect and can inform him of the disadvantages of remaining silent.'39 Formal charging does not change these
rules; police may continue interrogation.
German courts have also developed special rules with respect to use of
deception. Affirmative misrepresentation is barred, and misimpressions
about the law must also be corrected. 40 Although undercover work is permitted under some circumstances, questioning by undercover agents in jail
is prohibited, on the ground it violates the rules of detention.""4
With respect to sanctions, exclusion is mandated when the police fail
to advise of the right to silence or counsel, unless the person is shown to
have already known of these rights.'4 2 Additionally, German courts exclude confessions when police use certain techniques, such as hypnosis
or illegal promises, regardless of whether the resulting confession is co134. Id. at 160.
135. Id. at 161-62. JEAN PRADEL, PROCEDURE PENALE 398 (9th ed. 1997).
136. CCP, supra note 21, at § 136.
137. Id.
138. See Weigend, supra note 21, at 200-01.
139. Id. at 201-02. If, on the other hand, the suspect requests counsel, police must stop
questioning unless the suspect "expressly declares" a willingness to continue. See Stephen C.
Thaman, Mirandain Comparative Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 581, 602 (2001).
140. See Weigend, supra note 21, at 202-03.
141. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to
American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV.
317, 333, 336-37 (1995); CCP, supra note 21, at § 136a.
142. Weigend, supra note 21, at 204; Bradley, supra note 14, at 215.
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erced.' Exclusion for violation of other rules, such as those banning
deception, may depend upon the seriousness of the case and the importance of the evidence." Further, the fruits of illegally 45obtained
confessions, even those that are coerced, need not be excluded.'
C. An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Differences
There are at least three independent reasons for telling a suspect he
has a right to remain silent when police attempt to interrogate him. The
Miranda Court reasoned that knowledge of the right and the ability to
exercise it in unfettered fashion counteracts the "compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings."'' 4 6 The assurance of silence also lets the guilty
defendant know that he is not confronted by the "cruel trilemma" of
choosing between self-accusation, fabrication or some type of sanction
for silence. 147 Finally, the right to silence warning reminds the police that
they may not resort to the inquisitorial practice of relying on the defendant for their information. The warning thus also protects the innocent,
who otherwise might be subjected to prolonged interrogation by officers
accustomed to depending upon confessions as their main source of evidence. As Dean Wigmore put it, "[i]f there is a right to an answer, there
soon seems
to be a right to the expected answer-that is, to a confession
48
guilt"'1
of
For the same sorts of reasons, the Miranda Court believed that suspects are entitled to counsel during interrogation and to be told of that
right. Without counsel present, suspects might become confused, on their
own or with help from the police, about the scope of their right to silence. They also need help assessing the advisability of confessing.
Finally, of course, counsel's presence
should alleviate the coercive at49
stationhouse.1
the
of
mosphere
Miranda and its progeny implement these goals only imperfectly,
however. The suspect is not told that he has a right to terminate
questioning at any time. Furthermore, the suspect can waive the rights to
silence and counsel relatively easily; indeed, as indicated above, even a
waiver obtained through trickery is valid, if it is not "coerced." Finally,
143. CCP, supra note 21, at § 136a.
144. See Federal Court of Appeals, 3d Senat (panel), decision of April 9, 1986 (BGHSt
34, 29) (excluding statements obtained by deception but reserving whether different result
would be required if resolution of serious accusation could only be achieved by means of

proof not permitted by CCP).
145. Weigend, supra note 21, at 203-04.
146. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).

147. See Murphy v.Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
148. JOHN WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1960).
149. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 ("[Counsel's] presence would insure that statements
made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.").
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the suspect is not told that statements made in response to illegal
questioning can still be used for impeachment purposes, or that the fruits
of such statements are admissible.
Despite the many loopholes in the Miranda regime, it appears to
control certain facets of the interrogation process better than either English or German law, and clearly places more restrictions on police
questioning than French law. In England, police may tell the suspect that
silence may be used against him, an action that is strictly forbidden in
the United States on the ground that it would eviscerate the right to silence. In France, questioning may continue after a request for counsel,
again something American law prohibits unless the defendant reinitiates,
on the theory that invocation of the right to counsel indicates the defendant has decided he cannot face the police alone.5 In France and
Germany, police may bar counsel from the interrogation, again in contrast to United States law. Finally, illegally obtained incriminating
statements are excluded more frequently in the United States, where
good faith failure to give warnings is not excusable, and verbal fruits of
coerced interrogations are always excluded.'5 '
On the other hand, England and Germany, and perhaps France, put
more limitations on the use of trickery or, as Professor Vrij puts it, on
"American-style" questioning.' 52 While American courts focus on
whether interrogation techniques are "coercive," and often find that
trickery is not, European law appears to be less fixated on coercion per
se and more focused on the propriety of police conduct. Furthermore, the
taping requirement in England, designed to provide accurate information
about the interrogation process, clearly exceeds American constitutional
requirements. Finally, unlike English and French law, American constitutional law neither imposes finite time limits on interrogation sessions nor
requires any particular type of record keeping.
These observations about the differences between the various countries raise several empirical issues. The following four issues are
arguably the most important. First, does the warnings regime of Miranda
and its progeny better alleviate coercion than either a no-warnings regime (pre-2000 France) or a quasi-warnings regime where the suspect is
told silence may be used against him (England)? Second, what is the
impact of "trickery" on suspects? Third, what is the impact of taping on
150. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (equating invocation of
counsel with "desire to deal with police only through counsel").
151. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 7, at § 16.05.
152. Albert Vrij, 'We Will Protect Your Wife and Child, But Only If You Confess': Police
Interrogations in England and the Netherlands, in ADVERSARIAL V. INQUISITORIAL TECHNIQUES: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 8 (Peter J. Koppel &
Stephen D. Penrod eds., in press 2002) (manuscript on file with author).
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suspect and police behavior? Finally, what is the "cost" of the Miranda
regime, especially in terms of lost convictions?
Each question poses empirical difficulties. The research tentatively
suggests, however, that the Miranda regime better protects against compelled statements than either a no-warnings or quasi-warning approach,
while exacting a relatively small cost on crime control. The research also
suggests that trickery is an effective way of obtaining confessions and
that taping increases police ability to obtain incriminating statements.
Although most of these studies originated in the United States, research
from England is also occasionally noted in the following discussion.
Coercion with and without Miranda. No easy way of quantifying
"coercion" in the interrogation context exists because the concept is so
difficult to define and because, even if defined uniformly, its subjective
nature makes measurement challenging. Present research at best provides information that can act as a proxy for assessing coerciveness.
Professors Meares and Harcourt have identified three such proxies:
knowledge of rights, number of interrogations conducted, and confession
rates.' 53 This proxy information suggests, but does not prove, that
Miranda has diminished the coerciveness of police interrogations in the
United States.
First, more suspects and more police know of the right to remain silent and right to counsel now than before Miranda.Police routinely read
suspects their rights,1 4 and more than 80% of the population at large are
familiar with them.' 5 If the three rationales for Mirandadescribed above
are correct, then knowledge of these rights, by itself, should reduce the
coercive aspects of interrogation.
Second, evidence suggests that police conduct proportionately fewer
interrogations since Miranda, which at least one study attributes to
Miranda's warning regime.'56 If that conclusion is right, then Miranda
reduces compulsion during interrogation by reducing the opportunity for
its occurrence.

153. Tracy L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: TransparentAdjudication and
Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 758-768 (2001).
154. See Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

266, 276 (1996).
155. See Samuel Walker, TAMING

THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMI-

1950-1990, at 51 (2000); see also Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III,
Preface to THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING at xv (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (asserting "[s]chool children are more likely to recognize
Miranda warnings than the Gettysburg Address").
156. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogationsin the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 854-58 (1996).
NAL JUSTICE
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Third, a considerable amount of pre/post research indicates that confession rates dropped after Miranda,although debate over precisely how
much continues. After considering twelve studies and excluding three of
them as unreliable, Professor Cassell concluded that the reduction in
confessions resulting from Miranda averaged 16.1%.' Professor Schulhofer, examining the same studies and excluding five of them as
unreliable, concluded that Mirandareduced the confession rate between
6.7% and 9.1%, and argued further that the reduction may have been as
low as 4 to 5% if certain other adjustments were made.' 8 Even the lower
figures show that Miranda has had some effect on the interrogation
process.
One might wonder, however, why Mirandahas not had a greater impact on the confession rate. After all, a rational guilty person who is told
that he may remain silent and consult an attorney would presumably decide not to confess, at least until he had met with an attorney. At least
three motivations for talking under such circumstances have been suggested: a belief that confession will bring a better deal, the stress that
accompanies detention, and the natural urge to talk.'59 All three of these
phenomena may lead to a confession without police prompting. On the
other hand, police can also take advantage of these vulnerabilities, which
leads to the next topic.
Trickery and Confessions. As used here, trickery consists of an
outright fabrication or a failure to correct a misimpression that is not
"coercive," as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. For comparative
purposes, understanding the impact of such deceitful techniques is most
important, because they are allowed in the United States but limited to
varying degrees in European countries. Examples of trickery, already
noted, include false statements that a co-defendant confessed or that
certain evidence was found at the scene of the crime, and continued
questioning after the suspect has demonstrated he believes oral
statements are inadmissible. Showing false sympathy for the suspect, a
technique widely recommended in American police manuals,' 6 would
also constitute trickery under this definition. In contrast, telling the
suspect that he does not have a right to remain silent or a right to
157. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda'sCosts: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
387, 395-417 (1996).
158. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda'sPracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 539-41 (1996).
159. Vrij, supra note 152, at 2. Despite Miranda,physical coercion still occasionally occurs and may also induce a suspect's confession. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED
STATES: A BRIEFING FOR THE UN COMMITTEE ON TORTURE 14-15 (2000) (detailing recent
use of torture during interrogation in the United States).
160. See FRED E. INBAU, JOHN REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS

96-99 (3d ed. 1986).
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counsel-in other words, lies about Fifth Amendment law-would not
be permissible, because such statements recreate the coercive
atmosphere the warnings are designed to diminish. Additionally, lies that
are tantamount to threats-for instance, a false statement that the
suspect's spouse will be detained or harmed if a confession is not
forthcoming-are clearly coercive in the due process
sense and should
6
not be viewed as "American-style" questioning. '
Observational research suggests that trickery, so defined, can be very
effective at obtaining confessions. Professor Leo found in his study of
182 interrogations that the only variables significantly related to a successful interrogation are the number of psychological tactics
interrogators employ and the length of the interrogation. '62 In another
article, he describes several successful trickery techniques; foremost
among these strategies are the creation of a relaxed, friendly atmosphere,
de-emphasis of the warnings' importance, and persuading the suspect
that talking is in his legal interest.' Even more recently, in an article
tellingly entitled "Adapting to Miranda," Professor Leo, along with Professor White, described a number of other ways in which the police work
around Miranda's strictures.'64
This research suggests why Miranda has not caused confession rates
to fall more precipitously. In the wake of that decision, police may have
abandoned their most coercive techniques, but at the same time devised
more subtle ways of obtaining confessions. What we do not know is
whether or how often such trickery induces innocent persons to confess.
Although many false confessions have been documented,'6 5 most were
obtained under conditions and in response to police techniques more
"coercive" than the type of trickery at issue here."6

161.

Cf Vrij, supra note 152, at 10 (suggesting the United States permits such question-

ing).
162. Leo, supra note 154, at 275.
163. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of MirandaRevisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 660-65 (1996).
164. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators
Strategies for Dealing with Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999) (de-

scribing techniques ranging from manufacturing of evidence to the "pretended friend"
technique).
165. See generally, Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM.

PSYCHOL. 221 (1997) (documenting dangers of confession evidence); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriagesof Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

429 (1998) (discussing falsely induced confessions).

166. See Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police InterrogationPractices:How Faris Too Far?,
99 MIcH. L. REV. 1168, 1194 (2001) ("[Tjhe studies on false confessions fail to prove, oreven
strongly to suggest, that a significant number of persons have been wrongly convicted because
of false confessions obtained by police using deceptive interrogation techniques.").
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The Effect of Taping. A National Institute of Justice survey provides
the most detailed information on the American experience with taping
interrogations. That survey found that, although not constitutionally required to do so, at least one-sixth of American police and sheriff's
departments' audio or videotape interrogations on a mandatory or discretionary basis.'67 Despite initial reluctance, most police officers eventually
found that taping improved interrogation practices, facilitated the introduction of confessions into evidence, and made those confessions more
convincing in court. From this account, one might conclude that taping
improves confession and conviction rates. In fact 59.8% of the departments surveyed stated that taping increased the amount of incriminating
information obtained from suspects. 68 Reports on the English experience
similarly indicate that, at worst, taping has not diminished the confession
rate.' 69 At the same time, audio or videotaping would presumably reduce
egregious police behavior (including illegal trickery techniques) while
the tape is running.
Of course, the tape is not always running. As noted above, in the
United States taping is discretionary in many of the departments that use
it. In England, the taping requirement only applies to interviews in the
stationhouse. Many interviews in England take place in the field, a practice that taping may actually encourage.170
Costs of Miranda.As with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
important to any assessment of Miranda'simpact is its effect on law enforcement's ability to solve crime. The previously recited data on the
drop in confessions post-Mirandamay furnish some indirect information
on that score. But the conclusion that Miranda reduces confession rates
does not dictate the conclusion that it also reduces conviction rates. Police unable to get a confession might resort to other investigative
techniques to obtain the evidence necessary for conviction. Indeed, that
is one of the rationales underlying Miranda-the hope that its warnings
requirement will sway police from their tendency to engage in inquisitorial practices.

167.

WILLIAM

GELLER,

POLICE

VIDEOTAPING

OF

SUSPECT

INTERROGATIONS

AND

CONFESSIONS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTICES (1993).

168. Id. at 54, 107-49.
169. See generally, Albert Vrij, Interviewing Suspects, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:
TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 133-35 (A. Mermon, Albert Vrij, & R. Bull

eds., 1998) (discussing protections offered by taping confessions).
170. Stephen J. Moston & Geoffrey M. Stephenson, Helping the Police with their En-

quiries Outside the Police Station, in SUSPICION AND SILENCE: THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 50-65 (D. Morgan & G. M. Stephenson eds., 1994); Michael
McConville, Video Taping Interrogations:Police Behaviour On and Off Camera, 1992 CRIM.
L. REV. 532, 546 (1992).
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Unfortunately, a clear empirical picture of Miranda's effect on conviction rates does not exist. Professors Cassell and Schulhofer have
debated this issue as well. Combining his estimate that Mirandacaused a
16.1% drop in confessions with an estimate that confessions are needed
to convict in 24% of cases in which interrogations occur, Cassell concluded that Miranda caused a lost conviction ,in 3.8% of cases in which
police resorted to interrogation.' 7' Schulhofer, using his lower estimate of
the reduction in confessions caused by Miranda, as well as a lower figure for the necessity of confessions (19%), concluded
that, at most,
7
convictions.
in
drop
1.1%
a
about
brought
Miranda
Cassell also attempted to calculate Miranda's effect on clearance
rates, which report the number of crimes solved (through conviction or
otherwise). He initially suggested that Miranda caused a drop in clearance rates from approximately 60% to approximately 45%,173 a
conclusion Schulhofer disputed on several grounds.' 74 Later, using a
more sophisticated regression analysis, Cassell and Fowles concluded
that Miranda produced a 6.7% drop in the clearance rate for total violent
crimes, and a 2.3% drop in the clearance rate for total property crimes.'7
Applying slightly different statistical methods to the same data, Professor Donohue agreed that around 1966, when Mirandawas decided, there
was a statistically significant drop in clearance rates with regard to larceny and total violent crimes, but concluded that no such drop occurred
in connection with other property crimes or for the individual crimes
comprising the category of total violent crimes (murder, robbery, rape,
and assault). He also pointed out Cassell's failure to account for the impact of unquantifiable variables that might cause
reduced clearance rates,
76
such as changes in police reporting of crime.'
Other possible costs of Miranda can be imagined. Perhaps, for instance, Miranda distracts reviewing courts from the primary goal of
inhibiting coercive police techniques. Some evidence suggests that, once
police show they administered warnings to a suspect, further judicial
171. Cassell, supra note 157, at 484.
172. Schulhofer, supra note 158, at 545.
173. Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda'sDefenders,

90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084. 1089 (1996).
174. Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda and ClearanceRates, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 278, 281-82

(1996).
175. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda'sHarmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1082 (1998).
176. John J. Donohue, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1147 (1998). One other commentator has concluded that Cassell's attempt to deduce
Miranda's effect through clearance rate analysis is impossible. Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1
(2000).
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inquiry into police actions is sometimes cursory."' Similarly, the police
themselves may be less diligent about regulating their behavior in a
Miranda regime, thinking that their legal obligations end after they give
the warnings. These hypotheses, however, remain largely speculative. A
more obvious cost is that Miranda requires the government to provide
counsel to indigent defendants at a much earlier stage in the criminal
process than was previously the case.
D. Implicationsof the Research
This summary of the research suggests that, compared to a regime in
which no warnings are given, such as existed in France prior to 2000, the
Miranda regime alleviates the coercive aspects of the interrogation
process. The Miranda regime probably also marginally compromises
police ability to solve crimes compared to a no-warnings system. But
Miranda appears to have reduced inappropriate pressure to confess in a
large number of cases without sacrificing an equivalent number of
convictions.
A comparison of the warnings regime that exists in the United States
to the quasi-warnings regime in England is harder to make, because the
latter approach at least apprizes the suspect of the rights to silence and
counsel, albeit in a fashion that significantly diminishes their worth. In
theory, the quasi-warnings regime is closer to a no-warnings regime than
a warnings regime. Statistics on confession rates, however, suggest the
quasi-warnings approach may not be much different from Miranda, at
least as the latter approach is implemented in the United States. Professor Thomas, surveying a number of American studies, estimated the
average post-Miranda confession rate to be 50% to 55%, '78while Professor Leo found a 64% confession rate among his sample,7 9 and Cassell
concluded the rate to be much lower than 50%.' To compare those rates
with England's, it is instructive to look at pre-PACE data (when no cautions were required), data from 1986 to 1994 (when cautions were
required and adverse inferences could not be drawn) and post-1994 data
(the regime described above). Before cautions were required in England,

177. George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and the Future of the Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000)

("Once a suspect waives Miranda (and most do) the routinized Miranda ritual lulls judges into
admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.").
178. George C. Thomas III, Dialogue on Miranda-PlainTalk About the Miranda Em-

piricalDebate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions,43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 958 (1996).
179. Leo, supra note 154, at 300-01.
180. Cassell, supra note 157, at 459.
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confession rates were between 65% and 75% 181 After 1986, they fell
significantly to between 40% and 50%. 82' After 1994, the one reported
study indicated that the confession rate rose again to 58%.83
If the post-1994 confession rates in England are essentially the same
as the post-Mirandaconfession rates in the United States, and assuming
variables other than legal rules have no effect (an admittedly significant
assumption), either the quasi-warnings used in England are not as compulsive as earlier conjectured or the greater use of trickery in the United
States makes up the difference. The reasons for rejecting the first explanation (i.e., the cautions in England essentially tell the suspect he should
not exercise his right to remain silent) and for accepting the second explanation (i.e., trickery has been a successful interrogation technique)
have already been advanced." 4 If one accepts those reasons, a crucial
normative question arises: Despite the likelihood that such a move would
reduce the confession rate significantly, should trickery be prohibited (at
the same time, perhaps, that taping is mandated to ensure that such a
prohibition is followed)?
This is not the place to answer this question in full. I have recently
advanced the argument that trickery that is not coercive may be
permissible during custodial interrogation (although I would define
coerciveness more broadly than the Court). Based on the work of moral
philosopher Sissela Bok, I contended that if the police have probable
cause to believe in the suspect's guilt (which is normally the case when
custodial interrogation occurs), they may treat him as an "enemy" a
situation in which Bok, normally hostile to deceit, would permit it." 5
However, others disagree with this position, contending that it distorts
Bok's premises and undermines the trust that is essential to good police
work and to a well-functioning society. 86 Inter-national differences
might also affect this analysis. Perhaps Americans, whose "rampant
individualism"' 8 7 helped create an adversarial process which more than
181. Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testinonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 127 (1986).
182. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS: CONFESSIONS AND
TESTIMONY 324 (1992); Baldwin, supra note 127, at 335 (examining confession rates between

1989-90).
183. Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 829 n.129 (1998).
184. See supra, notes 160-166, and accompanying text.
185. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 ORE. L. REV. 775 (1997).

186. See Margie Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 ORE. L. REV. 817 (1997) and Robert
Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76 ORE. L. REV.

833 (1997).
187. David H. Bayley, Ironies of Law Enforcement, in 3 POLICE & LAW

ENFORCEMENT,

15, 19 (Robert J. Homant & Daniel B. Kennedy eds., 1980).
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occasionally leads to distortions of truth, are more comfortable with
trickery than Europeans and thus more willing to endorse deceitful
techniques.
Cultural and legal differences might also inform an analysis of
whether a quasi-warnings regime is fundamentally unfair or unduly coercive. For historical reasons, European legal culture may be less
bothered by a greater level of police coercion. Further, given the adjudicatory procedures followed on the Continent (although not in England,
where the quasi-regime is most strongly ensconced), police coercion
may be relatively irrelevant to the suspect. In both France and Germany,
defendants are expected to testify at their trial and reveal information
relevant to sentencing as well as guilt, because the same trier of fact decides both issues after a unitary trial. In addition, in both countries early
cooperation guarantees lighter sentences.' 8 This combination of pressures may be far more effective at motivating suspects to talk than
anything the police do.

CONCLUSION

On paper, American search and seizure rules that express a preference for warrants and require exclusion when illegality occurs provide
greater protection of privacy than do European search and seizure rules.
Likewise, in theory, the Miranda warnings regime protects autonomy to
a greater extent than European interrogation rules. In practice, the
American rules are not as potent as American courts and society seem to
believe, in part because of legal loopholes, and in part because the police
work around them. Consequently, the impact of American regulation of
police investigation does not differ exceedingly from the impact of the
less restrictive European regimes. For the same reason, the American
rules are less "costly" to law enforcement than some contend.
Borrowing from both American and European traditions, consider
briefly various alternative regulatory systems that might better regulate
the police without destroying their investigatory effectiveness. In the
search and seizure context, warrants might be required whenever possible, on the ground that their ex ante nature eliminates judicial hindsight
bias, foils police who want to lie, and improves the standard of care exercised by police who conduct searches. However, to alleviate the burden
of consulting a magistrate, warrants could be issued (as they sometimes
are in France and Germany) by prosecutors, who are more involved in
188. Van Kessel, supra note 183, at 833-35 (describing components of European sys-
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the investigation process and more accessible. To reduce any tendency of
these individuals to favor the police, evidence obtained as a result of an
invalid warrant would be excluded, a sanction that has a much more direct effect on prosecutors than it does on either police or magistrates.
Alternatively, one could imagine a system with relaxed substantive
search and seizure rules similar to those in European countries, but with
a meaningful damages sanction requiring individual officers to pay for
bad faith violations and the police department to pay for all other violations. Such a regime might deter officers more effectively than the
exclusionary rule, while simultaneously encouraging them to seek warrants as insulation from liability. It would also create a stronger incentive
for departments to develop serious training programs to reduce their officers' ignorant mistakes. Exclusion would not need to be a remedy,
although a German-style rule that suppressed evidence obtained through
particularly intrusive or offensive police actions might nicely supplement
such a regime."'
In the interrogation context, the United States might combine a
Miranda warnings requirement with the requirement that all interrogations be taped, an evidentiary ban on statements not on tape (about
which the suspect must be told), and rules governing the length of interrogation and related matters. At the same time, police could be permitted
to engage in trickery that is not coercive, a category that would become
better defined as courts examine these techniques via audio or videotape.
Alternatively, as some suggest,9 the United States could abolish custodial interrogation or render it irrelevant by providing that the only
admissible incriminating statements are those obtained by a magistrate,
who would conduct questioning immediately after arrest with defense
counsel present. To facilitate information gathering, the magistrate
would be allowed to advise the suspect that silence might increase suspicion, a process which is similar to the judicial questioning procedure that
takes place in France (except that France also accepts statements made
during police interrogation). Although this procedure undermines the
right to remain silent, the fact that it occurs in open court and is conducted with counsel present makes it relatively uncoercive as compared
to the usual stationhouse encounter.
Finally, any proposals adopted should be codified in legislation. The
disadvantages of relying on courts, which must wait for an appropriate
case and may announce only those rules suggested by the facts of that

189. Slobogin, supra note 38, at 440-41.
190. E.g., Paul G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused: A Remedy for the Third
Degree, 30 MIcH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
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case, are well documented.' 9' The European codes of criminal procedure
are far superior to the judicially created American rules in terms of comprehensiveness and clarity.
These concluding comments are offered merely as food for thought.
One benefit of comparative analysis is that it renders proposals that seem
radical from a domestic viewpoint less so because of foreign analogues.
More comparative and empirical work must be done, however, before
such proposals can be advanced with confidence.

191. See FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION, supra note 19, at 62-87
(1993) (detailing reasons Supreme Court is ill-suited for developing rules of criminal procedure).
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